Strawson [ 52]. These agents are not candidates for the range of emotional responses involved in our personal relationships because they do not participate in these relationships in the right way for such responses to be sensibly applied to them. Rather than taking up interpersonally-engaged attitudes that presuppose a demand for respect toward exempt agents, we instead take an objective attitude toward them.
We may be able, in limited circumstances, to take up a detached, objective perspective on the behavior of normal that is, non-exempt agents. But Strawson argues that we cannot take up with this perspective permanently, and certainly not on the basis of discovering that determinism is true:.
The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is, I think, to thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction [e.
More specifically, the truth of determinism would not show that human beings generally occupy excusing or exempting conditions that would make the attitudes involved in holding one another responsible inappropriate. Strawson [ 53]; emphasis in original ; nor would it follow from the truth of determinism. Strawson [ 59]. Various objections have been raised regarding P. As noted in the previous subsection, Strawson argues that learning that determinism is true would not raise general concerns about our responsibility practices.
Strawson [ 54]. In reply, it has been noted that while the truth of determinism might not suggest universal abnormality, it might well show that normal human beings are morally incapacitated in a way that is relevant to our responsibility practices Russell — Strawson 84—; Watson [ —]. The explanatory priority is the other way around: It is not that we hold people responsible because they are responsible; rather, the idea our idea that we are responsible is to be understood by the practice, which itself is not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and demands about our treatment of one another.
But there is something to be said from the other side of the debate. It may seem obvious that people are appropriately held responsible only if there are independent facts about their responsibility. But on reflection—and following R.
Such an interpretation requires an investigation into our practices, and what emerges most conspicuously, for Wallace, from this investigation is the degree to which our responsibility practices are organized around a fundamental commitment to fairness Wallace develops this commitment to fairness, and to norms of fairness, into an account of the conditions under which people are appropriately held morally responsible for their behavior — For a more recent defense of the response-dependent approach to responsibility, see Shoemaker b; for criticism of such approaches, see Todd Reasons-responsiveness approaches to responsibility have been particularly attentive to these issues.
Interpreted broadly, reasons-responsiveness approaches include a diverse collection of views, such as David Brink and Dana Nelkin , John M. Jay Wallace , and Susan Wolf Fischer and Ravizza begin with a distinction between regulative control and guidance control. Guidance control, on the other hand, does not require access to alternatives: it is manifested when an agent guides her behavior in a particular direction and regardless of whether it was open to her to guide her behavior in a different direction.
A number of factors can undermine guidance control. Thus, Fischer and Ravizza characterize possession of guidance control as partially dependent on responsiveness to reasons.
Guidance control also requires that an agent owns the mechanism on which she acts. In a Frankfurt case, an agent is responsible for an action even though his so acting is ensured by external factors. But the presence of these external factors means that the agent in a Frankfurt case would have acted the same no matter what reasons he was confronted with, which suggests that the responsible agent in a Frankfurt scenario is not responsive to reasons.
A strongly reasons-responsive mechanism would both recognize and respond to any sufficient reason to act otherwise But strong reasons-responsiveness cannot be required for guidance control since many intuitively responsible agents—i. On the other hand, weak reasons-responsiveness is not enough for guidance control. Fischer and Ravizza settle on moderate reasons responsiveness as the sort that is most germane to guidance control 69— Some critics focus on the contrast just noted between the conditions they impose on receptivity to reasons and those they impose on reactivity to reasons McKenna , Mele a, Watson Do our responsibility practices accommodate distinct forms of moral responsibility?
Are there different senses in which people may be morally responsible for their behavior? Contemporary interest in these possibilities has its roots in a debate between Susan Wolf and Gary Watson.
According to these views, a person is responsible for behavior that is attributable to her real self, and. Wolf The basic idea is that a responsible agent is not simply moved by her strongest desires, but also, in some way, approves of, or stands behind, the desires that move her because they are governed by her values or because they are endorsed by higher-order desires.
According to Wolf, one point in favor of Real Self views is that they explain why people acting under the influence of hypnosis or compulsive desires are often not responsible Since these agents are typically unable, under these conditions, to govern their behavior on the basis of their valuational systems, they are alienated from their actions in a way that undermines responsibility.
But, for Wolf, it is a mark against Real Self views that they tend to be silent on the topic of how agents come to have the selves that they do. However, Wolf argues that ascriptions of moral responsibility go deeper than such attributions can reach:. When…we consider an individual worthy of blame or of praise, we are not merely judging the moral quality of the event with which the individual is so intimately associated; we are judging the moral quality of the individual herself in some more focused, noninstrumental, and seemingly more serious way.
This latter ability will be impaired or absent in an agent whose real self is the product of pressures such as a traumatic childhood that have distorted her moral vision.
Watson agrees with Wolf that some approaches to responsibility—i. But Watson denies that these attributions constitute a merely superficial form of responsibility assessment. However, Watson agrees with Wolf that the above story of responsibility is incomplete: there is more to responsibility than attributing actions to agents.
The moral demands, and potential for adverse treatment, associated with holding others responsible are part of our accountability as opposed to attributability practices, and these features of accountability raise issues of fairness that do not arise in the context of determining whether behavior is attributable to an agent Watson [ ].
There is responsibility-as-attributability, and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, behavior is properly attributed to her as reflecting morally important features of her self—her virtues and vices, for example. But there is also responsibility-as-accountability, and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, which requires more than the correct attribution of behavior, she is open to being held accountable for that behavior in the ways that predominantly characterize moral blame.
Attributionists take moral responsibility assessments to be mainly concerned with whether an action or omission, character trait, or belief is attributable to an agent for the purposes of moral assessment, where this usually means that the action or omission, etc. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that contemporary attributionist views are interested only in specifying the conditions for what Watson calls responsibility-as-attributability. See the previous subsection for the distinction between accountability and attributability.
According to attributionism, fulfillment of attributability conditions is sufficient for holding agents accountable for their behavior. This means that attributionism rejects conditions on moral responsibility that would excuse agents if their characters were shaped under adverse conditions Scanlon —85 , or if the thing for which the agent is blamed was not under her control Sher b and , A. Attributionists reject these conditions on responsibility because morally and interpersonally significant behavior is attributable to agents that do not fulfill them, and such attributions are taken to be sufficient for an agent to be open to the responses involved in holding agents accountable for their behavior.
Attributionists have also argued that blame may profitably be understood as a form of moral protest Hieronymi , A. Smith , Talbert ; part of the appeal of this move is that moral protests may be legitimate in cases in which the above conditions are not met. Several objections have been posed to attributionism.
Some argue that attributionists are wrong to reject the conditions on responsibility mentioned in the last paragraph Levy , ; Shoemaker , a; Watson It has also been argued that the attributionist account of blame is too close to mere negative appraisal Levy ; Wallace 80—1; Watson In addition, Scanlon has been criticized for failing to take negative emotions such as resentment to be central to the phenomenon of blame Wallace , Wolf ; a similar criticism would apply to Sher a.
However, A. JoJo was raised by an evil dictator, and as a result he became the same sort of sadistic tyrant that his father was. As an adult, JoJo is happy to be the sort of person that he is, and he is moved by precisely the desires e. Part of what motivates this conclusion is the thought that it can be unreasonable to expect morally-impaired agents to avoid wrongful behavior, and that it is therefore unfair to expose these agents to the harm of moral blame on account of their wrongdoing.
For detailed development of the moral competence requirement on responsibility in terms of considerations of fairness, see R. The moral competence condition on responsibility can also be motivated by the suggestion that impaired agents are not able to commit wrongs that have the sort of moral significance to which blame would be an appropriate response. The basic idea here is that, while morally-impaired agents can fail to show appropriate respect for others, these failures do not necessarily constitute the kind of flouting of moral norms that grounds blame Watson [ ].
In other words, a failure to respect others, is not always an instance of blame-grounding disrespect for others, since the latter but not the former requires the ability to comprehend the norms that one violates Levy , Shoemaker Considerations about moral competence play an important role in the recent trend of conversational theories of responsibility, which construe elements of our responsibility practices as morally-expressive moves in an ongoing moral conversation.
The thought here is that to fruitfully and fully participate in such a conversation, one must have some degree of competence in the moral language of that conversation. Several prominent versions of the conversational approach develop P.
Jay Wallace argues, similarly, that since responsibility practices are internal to moral relationships that are. For additional defenses and articulations of the conversational approach to responsibility, see Stephen Darwall , Miranda Fricker , and Colleen Macnamara Impairments of moral competence come in degrees. However, at the far end of the spectrum, we encounter more globally and thoroughly impaired figures such as the psychopath.
In philosophical treatments, the psychopath is typically presented as an agent who, while retaining other psychological capacities, is entirely—or as nearly so as possible—incapable of responding appropriately to moral considerations.
This is something of a philosophical construct since real-life psychopathy admits of varying degrees of impairment, corresponding to higher or lower scores on diagnostic measures. And still others have argued that even those who are fully impaired for moral understanding are open to blame as long as they possess broader rational competencies Scanlon —; Talbert This section introduces contemporary skepticism about moral responsibility by way of discussions of several topics that have broad relevance for thinking about responsibility.
If moral responsibility requires free will, and free will involves access to alternatives in a way that is not compatible with determinism, then it would follow from the truth of determinism that no one is ever morally responsible. The skeptical positions discussed below are generally of this sort: the skeptical conclusions they advocate do not depend on the truth of determinism.
Is there such a thing as moral luck? Consider a would-be assassin who shoots at her target, aiming to kill, but fails to do so only because her bullet is deflected by a passing bird. It seems that such a would-be assassin has good moral outcome luck that is, good moral luck in the outcome of her behavior. One might think, in addition, that the would-be assassin is less blameworthy than a successful assassin with whom she is otherwise identical, and that the reason for this is just that the successful assassin intentionally killed someone while the unsuccessful assassin as a result of good moral luck did not.
For important recent defenses of moral luck, see Hanna and Hartman Of course, the successful assassin is responsible for something killing a person for which the unsuccessful assassin is not, but it might be possible to argue that both are morally responsible—and presumably blameworthy— to the same degree insofar as it was true of both of them that they aimed to kill, and that they did so for the same reasons and with the same degree of commitment toward bringing about that outcome see M.
Zimmerman and for this influential perspective. But now consider a different would-be assassin who does not even try to kill anyone, but only because his circumstances did not favor this option. This would-be assassin is willing to kill under favorable circumstances and so he may seem to have had good circumstantial moral luck since he was not in those circumstances. Perhaps the degree of responsibility attributed to the successful and unsuccessful assassins described above depends not so much on the fact that they both tried to kill as on the fact that they were both willing to kill; in this case, the would-be assassin just introduced may share their degree of responsibility since he shares their willingness to kill.
But an account that focuses on how agents would be willing to act under counterfactual circumstances is likely to generate unintuitive conclusions about responsibility since many agents who are typically judged blameless might willingly perform terrible actions under the right circumstances. Another approach to luck holds that it is inimical to moral responsibility in a way that generally undermines responsibility ascriptions.
If this is right, then perhaps,. Nagel [ 37]. See Russell for a compatibilist account that is led to a variety of pessimism, though not skepticism, on the basis of the concerns about moral luck just described.
The argument begins by noting that an agent makes the choices she does because of certain facts about the way she is: for example, the facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. But if this is true, then, in order to be responsible for her subsequent choices, perhaps an agent also needs to be responsible for the facts about what seems choiceworthy to her.
But how can one be responsible for these prior facts about herself? But this prior choice would itself be something for which the agent is responsible only if the agent is also responsible for the fact that that prior choice seemed choiceworthy to her. And now we must explain how the agent can be responsible for this additional prior fact about herself, which will require positing another choice by the agent, and the responsibility for that choice will also have to be secured, which will require explaining why it seemed choiceworthy to her, and so on.
Mores - customs and rules of conduct. Etiquette — rules of conduct concerning matters of relatively minor importance but which do contribute to the quality of life.
Violations of such rules may bring social censure. Etiquette deals with rules concerning dress and table manners and deal with politeness. Friendships would not likely break up over violations of these rules as they would for violating rules of morality, e. But they are made up by people to encourage a better life.
In each society there are authorities on these matters and there are collections of such rules. Many books are sold each year to prospective brides who want to observe the proper rules of decorum and etiquette. There are newspapers that have regular features with questions and answers concerning these matters. Etiquette deals with matters such as when do you place the napkin on your lap when you sit at a dining table? How long do you wait on HOLD on a telephone call with someone with call waiting?
Should you use a cell phone at the dining table? Should you have a beeper on or a cell phone on in class? In a movie theatre? Morality - rules of right conduct concerning matters of greater importance. Violations of such can bring disturbance to individual conscience and social sanctions. Law- rules which are enforced by society.
Violations may bring a loss of or reduction in freedom and possessions. So we have many rules and guidelines in relation to our behavior. In Ethics the focus is on the moral rules governing behavior. Just as an artist's creative activity has value because, in engaging in such activity, he expresses himself in a certain way--the artist does or need not make a difference but he does make a statement--so the distinctive value in acting in such a way as to be morally responsible lies in a certain sort of self-expression.
Fischer contends that life has a narrative structure in that "the meanings and values of the parts of our lives are affected by their narrative relationships with other parts of our lives, and the welfare value of our lives as a whole are not simple additive functions of the values of the parts" In this sense, our lives are stories.
In performing an action for which we are morally responsible, "we can be understood as writing a sentence in the book of our life" The essays in this volume, together with Fischer's other pieces, have played a major role in shaping the contemporary debate in the metaphysics of free will. Whether or not one ultimately agrees with the relevant positions that Fischer defends, one can ill afford to ignore the wealth of wisdom in the story of responsibility that Fischer carefully crafts.
I confine critical attention to two of its elements. Fischer concedes too much when he claims that his semicompatibilism would be far less engaging if determinism undermined other central moral assessments such as deontic ones.
After all, the conditions of satisfaction for the truth of one species of moral judgment need not coincide with those of another species. Further, Fischer attempts to insulate the integrity of deontic judgments against determinism by appealing to the premise that if a person like Sally is morally blameworthy for an action, then it is morally wrong for her to perform that action. If one accepts this premise, and if determinism undermines wrongness, then determinism undermines blameworthiness.
But I have argued that this premise is false. Blameworthiness requires not that an agent do wrong but that she perform an action on the basis of the belief that she is doing wrong in performing it. What Fischer offers on the value of moral responsibility is both intriguing and puzzling. First, there is the rich ambiguity of the terms 'value' and 'valuable.
But it seems that this is not the sense of 'value' or of 'valuable' at issue. With free action, for instance, one might propose in response to why such action is valuable in the strict sense that it is intrinsically good. Fischer suggests another sense of 'value' which is more apt, given the context. He says that when an agent exhibits guidance control and is, hence, morally responsible, "it is unattractive to think that the explanation of his moral responsibility--the intuitive reason why we hold him morally responsible--is that he makes a difference to the world.
Rather…he expresses himself in a certain way" The proposal is that the sense of 'value' at issue is associated with an intuitive explanation of why the person is morally responsible when she is so responsible. Elaborating, Fischer writes:. It may be that the proponents of the regulative control model are implicitly in the grip of the "making-a-difference" picture, whereas the proponents of the guidance control model are implicitly accepting the self-expression picture….
The debates about whether alternative possibilities are required for moral responsibility have issued in what some might consider stalemates; …I do not know of any decisive arguments employing Frankfurt-type examples for the conclusion that only guidance control, and not regulative control, is required for moral responsibility.
My suggestion is that if one finds the self-expression picture of moral responsibility more compelling than the making-a-difference picture, then this should incline one toward the conclusion that guidance control exhausts the freedom-relevant component of moral responsibility.
On this estimation of the significance of the self-expression picture, it is not transparent why the value of guidance control is tied to narrative value. Part of what it is to have narrative value, Fischer submits, is that the overall welfare value of one's life is not merely a function of adding up all the momentary levels of well-being. Suppose that one does not as I do not renounce "additiveness. Second, would shifting the focus of the debate on whether responsibility does in fact require alternative possibilities to the intuitive pictures to which Fischer calls our attention help to break the stalemate between the relevant rivals?
I have my doubts. If the value of guidance control is analogous to that of artistic self-expression, one would expect libertarians to plump for the position that artistic creativity, including genuine artistic self-expression, presupposes the falsity of determinism; either such creativity or self-expression requires the sort of authorship or ultimate origination that determinism precludes or it requires indeterministic causation of the constellation of behavior constitutive of such creativity or self-expression.
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